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Abstract
This article discusses the revised Article 7(4) of the European Communities’ Proposal for a
Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions. The article
argues that the revision of the proposal for the Second Directive by the Commission of the European Communities will mainly have two effects. First, the Commission’s review procedure will
no longer be on a case-by-case basis, but on a country-by-country basis; the Commission will
no longer interfere with an individual authorization procedure before the competent authorities
of a Member State. Second, the suspension of future authorizations depends on a finding by the
Commission that a specific country does not grant national treatment to EEC institutions; lack of
reciprocity is no longer a basis for a denial of an application. This new approach will allow the
Commission to defend against discriminations against EEC institutions abroad, while respecting
different banking policies in third countries.

THE RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENT OF
THE SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE OF
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY REVISITED
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In the last issue of the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal,
the authors discussed' the European Communities' Proposal
for a Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the
Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions
and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC (the "Second Directive").2 The authors especially analyzed the question of how
the Second Directive will affect non-EEC banks.'
Article 7 of the Second Directive, as originally submitted
on February 23, 1988, by the Commission of the European
Communities (the "Commission") to the Council of Ministers
of the European Communities (the "Council"), introduced a
requirement of reciprocity4 for the establishment or the acquisition of a credit institution subsidiary5 by a non-EEC person.'
This recipocity would have been an EEC-wide reciprocity, i.e.,
credit institutions from all Member States of the EEC were expected to enjoy reciprocal treatment in the country of the applying non-EEC bank or person. 7 Reciprocity was to be en* Partner, Shearman & Sterling, New York, New York. LL.B., 1962, University

of Mainz, Germany; M.C.L., 1963, LL.B., 1965, Columbia University School of Law;
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I. Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking'Direc/ive ofthe European Economic Commnnitv and ItsImportancefor .Von-EEC Banks, 12 FORD-AM INT'L L.J. 205 (1989).
2. COM(87) 715 final, O.J. C 84/1 (1988) [hereinafter Second Directive].
3. See Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 1,at 228-41.
4. See Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 1,at 228-29.
5. See id. at 220-22.
6. Second Directive, supra note 2, art. 7. at 4; see Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note
1,at 228.
7. See Second Directive, supra note 2; art. 7(5), at 4; see Gruson & Nikowitz, supra
note 1,at 228.
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forced by means of an advance consultation procedure with
the Commission initiated by the Member State, during which
the competent authority of the Member State had to suspend
its decision on the request by a non-EEC person to establish or
to acquire a subsidiary credit institution.8 Within three
months, the Commission was supposed to have examined
"whether all credit institutions of the Community enjoy reciprocal treatment, in particular regarding the establishment of
subsidiaries or the acquisition of participations in credit institutions in the third country in question." 9 If the Commission
would have found that reciprocity was not ensured in the country of the non-EEC person, supposedly against an EEC-wide
standard, it would have had the right to suspend the decision
of the Member State to permit the de novo formation or acquisition. 10
It was not possible to predict how narrowly or broadly the
reciprocity requirement, as it was contained in the original article 7 of the Second Directive, would have been construed. If
reciprocity had meant "absence of discrimination," reciprocity1
would have existed between the United States and the EEC,"
because the United States subscribes to the principle of "national treatment."' 1 2 However, if the EEC had intended to apply a kind of "mirror-image" reciprocity requirement, under
which a foreign credit institution's access to a country's financial markets is conditioned on that country's own credit institutions receiving privileges in the foreign market identical to
those in the home market, then difficult questions would have
arisen.' 3

The requirement of reciprocity and the procedure for examining reciprocity were the subjects of much criticism from
8. See Second Directive, supra note 2, art. 7(2)-(7), at 4; see also Gruson &
Nikowitz, supra note 1, at 228.
9. See Second Directive, supra note 2, art. 7(5), at 4; see also Gruson & Nikowitz,
supra note 1, at 228-29.
10. See Second Directive, supra note 2, art. 7(6), at 4; see also Gruson & Nikowitz,
supra note 1, at 229.
11. See Grusoi & Nikowitz, supra note 1, at 229-30.
12. See id.. at 213 n.39, 229 n.132; Comm. on Int'l Banking, Sec., and Fin. Transactions, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Issuance of Securities by Foreign Banks and Their Finance
Subsidiaries Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rule 6c-9, N.Y. INT'L L. REV.,
Winter 1988/89, at 29, 36 (E.T. Patrikis, Chairman, and E. Gewirtz and M. Gruson,
Reporters).
13. See Grunson & Nikowitz, supra note 1, at 230.
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non-EEC countries and from some EEC Member States. The
United States feared that the Glass-Steagall Act 14 and the prohibition against interstate banking in the United States would
be the basis for a finding by the Commission that reciprocity
did not exist with the United States.' 5 In addition, the power
of banks to acquire non-banking subsidiaries is far more restricted in the United States than in the EEC.' 6 England feared
that the reciprocity examination by the Commission could endanger England's role as leading international banking center
and as port of entry for foreign banks' 7 and rejected the Commission's right to turn down a third country request for the
establishment of a credit institution on English soil.
In response to the international criticism, the Commission
decided, on April 13, 1989, to revise article 7 of the Second
Banking Directive and to regulate the establishment or the acquisition of credit institution subsidiaries by non-EEC persons
in a different manner.' 8 The revised article 7 of the Second
Directive ("Revised Article 7") still requires that a Member
State inform the Commission of any request by a non-EEC
person to establish a subsidiary credit institution or to acquire
a participation in a credit institution resulting in a credit institution becoming an EC subsidiary' 9 of a non-EEC parent.2 0
In addition to the information given to the Commission
regarding specific applications, Revised Article 7(2) requires
each Member State to inform the Commission "of any general
difficulties encountered by their credit institutions in establishing or carrying out banking activities in any third country. "21
Revised Article 7(3) requires that the Commission "shall,
14. The Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 1, at
233-35.
15. See Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 1, at 232-37.
16. See id. at 237-39.
17. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, BANKING 1992, at 88 (1989).
18. Comm'n Information Memo, COM(89) 190, Apr. 13, 1989 [hereinafter Information Memo].
19. For the definition of "subsidiary" for the purpose of the Second Directive,
see Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 1, at 225 n.107.
20. Information Memo, siipra note 18, art. 7(1), at 3. A subsidiary of a non-EEC
parent that is "authorized" as a credit institution by the competent authorities of a
Member State will benefit from the principle of mutal recognition. See GrUson &
Nikowitz, supra note 1, at 241.
21. Id. art. 7(2), at 3.
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initially not later than six months before the Directive enters
into force and then periodically, draw up a report examining
the treatment of Community credit institutions." 2 This report
is to be in regard to "the establishment and carrying out of
banking activities, and the acquisition of participations in
credit institutions of third countries."" The2Commission
is re4
quired to submit'this report to the Council.
On the basis of such reports, or at any other time, if the
Commission believes that a third country is not granting to
EEC credit institutions "effective market access and competitive opportunities comparable to those accorded by the Community to credit institutions of that third country, ' ' 5 suitable proposals may be submitted by the Commission to the Council "with a view to
achieving such comparable access and competitive opportunities through negotiations between the Community and the
third country in question. 2 6
Additionally, on the basis of reports submitted under Revised Article 7(3), or at any other time, if the Commission believes that EEC credit institutions do not "enjoy national treatment and the same competitive opportunities as domestic credit institutions in a third country and that the condition of effective market
access has not been secured," 2 7 the Commission may, in addition to proposing negotiations with the third country, decide
that Member States' authorities "shall limit or suspend their
decisions regarding requests for new authorizations and acquisitions" by persons of the third country in question, using the
procedure provided for in article 20 of the Second Directive. 28
Under Revised Article 7, the Commission no longer has
the authority to suspend the decision of a Member State to
permit the de novo formation or acquisition in a particular
case. The Commission has two options:
22. Id. art. 7(3), at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. art. 7(4), at 4 (emphasis added). Compare id. with § 3501(b)(1) of the Primary Dealer Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5342(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988) ("same competitive opportunities").
26. Information Memo, supra note 18, art. 7(4), at 4.
27. Id. art. 7(5), at 5 (emphasis added).
28. Id.; see Second Directive, supra note 2, art. 20, at 9.
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(i) Under Revised Article 7(4),t if the third country
does not accord reciprocal treatment to EEC credit institutions (i.e., it does not accord the EEC credit institutions
"competitive opportunities comparable to those accorded
by the Community to credit institutions of that third country"), the Commission may propose to the Council to
achieve reciprocity by way of negotiation. The Commission has the same right if a third country does not accord
30
EEC credit institutions "effective market access."
(ii) Under Revised Article 7(5), if a third country
discriminates against EEC credit institutions (i.e., itdoes
not accord to EEC credit institutions "national treatment
and the same competitive opportunities as domestic credit
institutions"), the Commission may decide that the Member State shall generally restrict or suspend their approvals of establishments of credit institution subsidiaries and
of acquisitions of participations in credit institutions by
persons of the discriminating country. Revised Article
7(5) considers discrimination to be an event that calls for
the most serious reaction by the EEC.3 2
Revised Article 7(4), dealing with reciprocity, as well as
Revised Article 7(5), dealing with discrimination, mention lack
of "effective market access" for EEC credit institutions as a
triggering event.3 3 The meaning of this term is not clear.
"Market" could be a geographical market or a product or service market. It is possible that Revised Article 7 requires access by EEC credit institutions to the same product or service
markets in the third country to which non-EEC credit institutions have access in the EEC. In that case, lack of "effective
market access" would be a case of lack of reciprocity. If EEC
29. Information Memo, supra note 18, art. 7(4), at 4; see supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.

30. Information Memo, supra note 18, art. 7(4), at 4.
31. Id. art. 7(5), at 5; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
32. The effect of Revised Article 7(5) could be avoided if a bank from a discriminating country sets up a banking subsidiary in a non-discriminating country, which in
turn seeks in a Member State approval for the establishment of a credit institution
subsidiary or for the acquisition of a participation in a credit institution. The Commission might consider as the relevant third country either the country of origin of
the ultimate parent or the country in which the majority of the business of the banking group is being conducted. See Bank Holding Company Act § 3(d), 12 U.S.C.

§ 1842(d) (1982).
33. Information Memo, supra note 18, art. 7(4)-(5), at 4-5.
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credit institutions are excluded from geographic markets in a
third country (e.g., from access to certain states of a federative
country34 ) or from certain product or service markets to which
the third country credit institutions have access, lack of "effective market access" would be a case of discrimination.
However, it is still not clear whether U.S. banks meet the
reciprocity requirement of Revised Article 7(4). EEC-banks
may not have in the United States "competitive opportunities
comparable" to those afforded by the EEC to EEC credit institution subsidiaries of U.S. banks. Although Revised Article 7
supposedly does not require a "mirror image" reciprocity as
the original article 7 of the Second Directive may have done,
reciprocity may still be'denied. The right of an EEC credit institution subsidiary of a U.S. bank to establish freely branches
and to do business throughout the EEC, granted by the Second Directive, must be measured against the restrictions on interstate banking prevailing in the United States.3 5 If a U.S.
bank attempts to set up or acquire a credit institution subsidiary in a Member State that permits its banks to underwrite corporate equity and debt securities or to deal in securities, the
Commission might well reach the conclusion that EEC credit
institutions do not have comparable competitive opportunities
in the United States, because a bank from that Member State
could not engage in such activities in the United States if it has
a deposit-taking facility. in the United States. This result is
mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act, which has become a focal
point of the reciprocity discussion.3 6 But lack of reciprocity
will now have a different consequence under Revised Article 7
than it had before.
In summary, Revised Article 7 will use two standards: 1) a
reciprocity requirement will merely trigger the Commission's
right to propose negotiations with a specific third country in
question; and 2) a requirement for national treatment (or nondiscrimination) will now decide whether the Commission may
34. "Many states either restrict or prohibit foreign bank, branch or agency offices. Accordingly, in some states a banking subsidiary may be the only way in which
a foreign bank can establish a full service banking office." Carr & More, Developments
in the Regulationi of Foreign Banik Operatioms i the United States, 1988 U. ILL. I.. REV. 225,
at 249.
35. See Gruson & Nikowitz, supra note 2, at 235-37.
36. See id. at 233-35; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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refuse access to the European banking market vis-A-vis a certain country. Thus, the revision of the Commission proposal
for the Second Directive will mainly have two effects: First, the
Commission's review procedure will no longer be on a case-bycase basis, but on a country-by-country basis; the Commission
will no longer interfere with an individual authorization procedure before the competent authorities of a Member State. Second, the suspension of future authorizations 37 depends on a
finding by the Commission that a specific country does not
grant national treatment to EEC institutions; lack of reciprocity
is no longer a basis for a denial of an application. This new
approach will allow the Commission to defend against discriminations against EEC institutions abroad, while respecting different banking policies in third countries. It must be kept in
mind, however, that even the language of Revised Article 7 is
broad enough to allow the EEC to take aggressive positions
against third-country discriminatory or non-reciprocal treatment of EEC credit institutions if the political climate in the
EEC requires such approach. The revised version of the Second Directive is scheduled to be adopted by the Council this
summer.
37. The decision of the Commission under Revised Article 7(5) will not have a
retroactive effect ("new authorizations and acquisitions"). Information Memo, supra
note 18, art. 7(5), at 5. Thus, credit institutions already authorized before the implementation of the Second Directive or before the Commission has taken the decision
to refuse future authorizations with repect to the applicable third country, will benefit
from the mutual recognition.

